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ABSTRACT: The aim of the article is to discuss the Norwegian Model of 
hydrocarbon management and its impact on building a just and equal society. 
Since 1972, the model has been based on the separation of policy, commercial, 
and regulatory functions. Within each area there is state-controlled institution 
with its own distinct role. This model of separation of duties is however combined 
with other unique features which cannot be easily copied by other counties. 
These include a long tradition and high level of democratic co-operation, inter-
governmental checks and balances, socio-democratic traditions of strong public 
involvement, mature institutional capacity (mainly a competent bureaucracy) 
and highly developed model of co-operation between government, business and 
research institutions.
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Introduction
The Norwegian Model of government administration of the 
petroleum sector since 1972 has been based on a separation of 
policy, commercial, and regulatory functions. Within each area 
there are state-controlled institutions with their own distinct roles. 
The Ministry of Petroleum and Energy is a policy-making body 
working with the political leadership on setting goals for the sector, 
making assumptions for the realization of these goals and framing 
the licensing process. Commercial functions are ceded to the partly 
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state-owned company Statoil which carries out operations both in 
Norway and oversees. All regulatory and technical guidelines are 
within the competences of the Norwegian Petroleum Directorate with 
a wide range of duties from setting regulations related to resource 
management, collecting fees from oil operators and compiling data 
on all hydrocarbon activities on the Norwegian Continental Shelf. 
This model of separation of duties is however combined 
with other unique features which cannot be easily copied by 
other counties. These include a long tradition and high level of 
democratic competition, inter-governmental checks and balances, 
socio-democratic traditions of strong public involvement in sectors 
considered to be of strategic importance to the country, mature 
institutional capacity (mainly a competent bureaucracy) and 
a highly developed model of co-operation between government, 
business and research institutions. Taking into account all of 
these features, the aim of the article is to discuss the Norwegian 
Model of hydrocarbon management with the main assumption of its 
uniqueness and distinctiveness from other countries.
The hypothesizes are:
• the model of state management of the petroleum sector in 
Norway is highly efficient;
• the success of the sector lies in socio-political conditions and 
properly designed administration model;
• continuity and predictability of the sector results in social and 
political trust. 
Norwegian petroleum history
The history of the Norwegian petroleum sector can 
unquestionably be called a “success story”. It started in the early 
1960s of the twentieth century, when the new found optimism 
regarding the North Sea’s petroleum potential was initiated by the 
gas discovery in Groningen in the Netherlands in 1959. In October 
1962, Philips Petroleum sent an offer to the Norwegian authorities, 
to explore oil in the Norwegian continental shelf which in the long 
run was an attempt to acquire exclusive rights. The Norwegian 
government refused to sign over the entire shelf to a single company 
due to the threat of monopolization. 
In May 1963, the Government proclaimed sovereignty over the 
Norwegian continental shelf. The State was the sole landowner, and 
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only the King (Government) could grant licences for exploration and 
production. Final agreements with Denmark and the UK to delineate 
the continental shelf were signed in March 1965 on the basis of the 
equidistance principle. On 13 April 1965 the first licensing round 
was announced and 22 production licenses were awarded, covering 
78 blocks (Norwegian Petroleum Directorate b, 10). 
With the discovery of Ekofisk, 1969 can be considered the start 
of the petroleum era in Norway which has not experienced any 
impediments till now. Production from the field started in 1971, 
and several large discoveries were made in the following years. 
The exploration started in the North Sea and has gradually moved 
north as knowledge and capabilities have increased. In 1979, the 
government decided to open up petroleum activity in the area to the 
north of the 62nd parallel with exploration was gradually initiated. 
In the early 1980s, exploration in parts of the Norwegian Sea and 
Barents Sea began and expanded northwards. 
From the very beginning the authorities limited the number 
of blocks in each licensing round, and the most promising areas 
were explored first. This led to immense discoveries in large 
fields such as Ekofisk, Statfjord, Oseberg, Gullfaks and Troll. 
With growing production in these fields as well as an adequate 
infrastructure enabling a tie-in of a number of other fields, 
exports to West European countries developed. Gas pipelines 
exported hydrocarbons to Belgium, France Germany, and Great 
Britain. In 1993, production began in the Norwegian Sea, and 
in 2007 it commenced in the Barents Sea (Norwegian Petroleum 
Directorate b, 10).
According to the Norwegian Petroleum Directorate, for the last 
50 years of exploitation about 47% of the estimated total recoverable 
resources have been used. In 2015, Norway produced 227.8 Sm³ 
o.e.1 of marketable petroleum, which was about 14 % lower than in 
the record year 2004 but 5 % higher than in 2014. Oil production 
since 2001 has been in a steady decline but gas production 
continues to grow. Gas sales totaled 115 billion Sm³ (40 MJ) in 
2015, a new record which illustrated the demand for natural gas 
in many parts of Europe. In 2015, gas accounted for just over 50 % 
of total production of oil equivalents. Norwegian estimations show 
that the high level of production will be sustained during the next 
decades but it still needs to be underlined that the country reached 
1 Standard cubic meters oil equivalents.
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peak production in 2004 with more than 260 million of m3 of oil 
equivalent (Norwegian Petroleum Directorate a).
Table 1. Historical And Expected Production in Norway, 1971–2021
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Legal and regulatory framework
The role of petroleum revenues for the last five decades has 
been strategic for the country mainly due to the sound policies 
of parties representing different ideological orientations. The 
whole management of the sector is based on the simple principle 
to provide a framework for the profitable production of hydrocarbons 
in the long term. It means that none of the political elites is eligible 
to rapidly increase production aimed at direct revenues to the state 
budget. 
The basic principle is direct state control of the whole sector 
and all laws and regulations aim at giving the state a superior 
and stable position in relation to both private and international 
players. The Norwegian legal framework around the petroleum 
sector consists of two laws: the petroleum law, and the petroleum 
tax law. 
Surprisingly, the general principles, dubbed “The 10 Oil 
Commandments”, which underpin the Norwegian oil policy date 
back to June 14, 1971 when the Standing Committee on Industry 
submitted a white paper from Norwegian Ministry of Petroleum and 
Energy in the Storting (the Norwegian Parliament). This was a clear 
Model of State Management of Petroleum Sector – Case of Norway 101
clarification of what was needed to ensure that the oil activities 
would “benefit the entire nation”.
Table 2. “The 10 Oil Commandments”
1. That national supervision and control of all activity on the Norwegian 
continental shelf must be ensured. 
2. That the petroleum discoveries must be exploited in a manner designed 
to ensure maximum independence for Norway in terms of reliance on others for 
the supply of crude oil. 
3. That new business activity must be developed, based on petroleum. 
4. That the development of an oil industry must take place with the necessary 
consideration for existing commercial activity, as well as for the protection of 
nature and the environment. 
5. That flaring of exploitable gas on the Norwegian continental shelf must only be 
allowed in limited test periods. 
6. That petroleum from the Norwegian continental shelf must, as a main rule, 
be landed in Norway, with the exception of special cases in which socio-political 
considerations warrant a different solution. 
7. That the State involves itself at all reasonable levels, contributes to coordinating 
Norwegian interests within the Norwegian petroleum industry, and to developing 
an integrated Norwegian oil community with both national and international 
objectives. 
8. That a state-owned oil company be established to safeguard the State’s 
commercial interests, and to pursue expedient co-operation with domestic and 
foreign oil stakeholders. 
9. That an activity plan must be adopted for the area north of the 62nd parallel 
which satisfies the unique socio-political factors associated with that part of the 
country. 
10. That Norwegian petroleum discoveries could present new tasks to Norway’s 
foreign policy. 
Source: Norwegian Ministry of Petroleum and Energy
Basically, at all stages of production (exploration, development 
and operations) the greatest possible value for society must be 
generated. Moreover, the revenues should not only benefit the State 
but Norwegian society as a whole. Aspects such as health & safety 
procedures, working environment requirements and environmental 
concerns must be taken into account throughout the industry. The 
petroleum sector also correlates it’s activities with other sectors in 
order to avoid the Dutch disease2.
2 Dutch disease – an increase in the economic development of a specific 
sector (for example natural resources), which causes decline in other sectors (like 
the manufacturing sector or agriculture).
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The state has also decided that the best commercial effects in the 
petroleum sector can be achieved with a mix of public and private 
activities with sustained strong state ownership. This model has 
dominated since the mid-1980s when the conservative prime minister 
Kåre Willoch decided to ease state control the over sector. The state is 
responsible for setting a clear and predictable regulatory framework 
and oil companies and other actors carry the responsibility of 
exploration, development and production of oil and gas. The aim of 
this shared system is to find a possible balance between the state’s 
(society) interest and that of commercial actors. 
It is the State that has the proprietary right to offshore 
petroleum deposits on the Norwegian continental shelf. Initially, 
the State had a 50 per cent ownership interest in each production 
license, however in 1993, this principle was altered, and now in 
each individual case an assessment is made as to whether the 
State will participate and to what extent. The main tool to achieve 
revenues from the sector is tax policy and regular institutional 
oversight of resource management. The current ordinary tax rate 
that companies are subject to (not on oil and gas fields) is 25%, 
which aims at ensuring value creation for society. In 2015 alone, 
tax revenues from petroleum activities were about NOK 104 billion 
(Norwegian Petroleum Directorate c). 
The petroleum companies are obliged to obtain official approvals 
and permits for all phases of the petroleum activities (award of 
exploration and production licenses, acquisition of seismic data and 
exploration drilling, development and operation, and plans for field 
cessation). 
The Petroleum Act of 29 November 1996 gives the general legal 
basis for the Norwegian petroleum activities, which are based 
on the licensing system (Act 29 November 1996 No. 72 relating 
to petroleum activities). Licenses are granted for the exploration, 
production and transport of petroleum, however the area of interest 
must first be opened for petroleum activities. An impact assessment 
of the Ministry of Petroleum and Energy includes factors such as 
environmental, financial, and social impacts (Act 29 November 
1996 No. 72 relating to petroleum activities, Chapter 3). Each year, 
the Norwegian Government opens a licensing round – a certain 
number of blocks for which production licenses are available. 
The criteria for procurement are announced, non-discriminatory, 
objective, and relevant. It is important to stress that a license grants 
companies exclusive rights to surveys, exploration drilling and 
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production of petroleum within the covered geographical area and 
that the petroleum that is produced belongs to the licensee. 
Table 3. Net Government Cash Flow from Petroleum Activities, 1971–2017
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Norwegian petroleum activities are also regulated by the 
European Union (EU) law, and the World Trade Organization 
agreements. The laws and directives that stem from the European 
Economic Area (EEA) agreement have a special position, as they are 
both national and international laws. The rules from the EEA have 
become part of Norwegian law, but are overseen by both the EFTA 
surveillance agency and the national courts. The most important 
EEA laws, apart from the general rules of the free movement of 
capital, persons, goods and services, require specific regulation 
on competition, non-discriminatory regulation, and direct state 
support. There are several EU/EEA directives that have had an 
immense impact on the Norwegian petroleum sector, notably Directive 
92/22/EF 30 May 1994 that regulates the conditions for hydrocarbon 
exploration, the Gas Market Directive, or Directive 98/30EF, 22 June 
1998 – Concerning rules for the internal market for natural gas.
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Organization of the state agencies
The main body responsible for framework regulations considering 
the petroleum sector is the Storting. All major development projects 
and changes in fundamental principles are deliberated in the 
Storting. Moreover, the parliament uses its legislative powers 
to shape laws and procedures connected with all stages of production 
and can review the Government and public sector activities in the 
area. Over the course of decades, a multi-party consensus has been 
made over the main directions and goals of the petroleum sector, 
and even though the composition of the parliament changes over 
time, the framework for activities is stable and predictable. This 
political agreement creates long-lasting comfortable conditions for 
both national and international investors aiming to be engaged long-
term on the Norwegian continental shelf. 
The main body of management of the shelf lies with the 
government which holds executive powers over petroleum policy. 
Due to the rapidity of the sector’s impact both on the economy 
and society, the government is supported by several ministries, 
directorates, supervisory authorities and state-owned companies. 
The Ministry of Petroleum and Energy is responsible for the 
efficient and environment-friendly management of Norway’s 
energy resources through a coordinated and integrated energy 
policy. The ministry also manages the public’s ownership interests 
in state companies Gassco AS, Petoro AS, Statoil AS and the 
State’s Direct Financial Interest. The subordinated and advisory 
body of the ministry is the Norwegian Petroleum Directorate, 
which is responsible for direct petroleum management in the 
area of exploration and production on the shelf. It has a wide 
range of competences including adaptation of regulations and 
other legislative solutions. The taxation system for the petroleum 
sector is governed by the Ministry of Finance via the Petroleum 
Tax Office. The office is responsible, on the one hand, for the 
assessment of the government tax proposals, and, on the other, 
for the collection of taxes. The Ministry of Finance also controls 
the Government Pension Fund Global which is the state fund 
that internationally invests revenues from the petroleum sector. 
The working environment, safety, and the sector’s emergency 
preparedness are supervised by the Ministry of Labour and Social 
Affairs. The technical and operational aspects are covered by the 
Petroleum Safety Authority. Other ministries involved in petroleum 
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policies are: the Ministry of Transportation and Communications 
– responsible for oil spill preparedness, the Ministry of Climate 
and Environment – safeguarding the external environment and 
the Ministry of Trade, Industry and Fisheries, consulted on how 
the activities of the petroleum sector will influence other sectors, 
mainly fisheries (Norwegian Petroleum Directorate d).
State companies responsible for the petroleum sector
The Norwegian state has also decided that petroleum activities 
should be operated by state-owned enterprises, which gives 
controlling powers but also allows for long-term planning and 
investment. At the very start of petroleum activities in the early 
1970s , political elites decided that the most competitive system and 
the highest level of competence of a young sector could be achieved 
by creating three Norwegian oil companies: a fully state-owned 
company – Statoil, one semi-private company – Norsk Hydro – and 
one fully private company – Saga. All were created in 1972 on the 
basis of political will. However, in 1999 Norsk Hydro acquired Saga 
Petroleum and in 2007 Statoil and Hydro were merged into one 
company (Olsen, 640). 
The position of Statoil was initially never questioned, as from 
1973 to 1985 the government awarded Statoil 50% or more of 
Norway’s petroleum development licenses. As Nelsen recognizes, 
“Few Norwegians questioned the need for the state to play a strong 
role in the economy, particularly in the petroleum sector, but many 
non-socialist politicians, and other supporters of private interests 
on the Norwegian shelf advocated trimming Statoil’s considerable 
financial and political power” (323). In the mid-1980s, due 
to political tensions caused by the high cash flows of Statoil, the 
company’s ownership was splitt in two, with approximately 20% 
retained by Statoil itself, and the rest given to the State’s Direct 
Financial Interest (SDFI) which is a portfolio of the Norwegian 
government’s directly owned exploration and production licenses 
for oil and natural gas on the Norwegian continental shelf. 
In 2001, this solution was no longer adequate as Statoil was 
partially privatized and so a new state-owned management 
company Petoro was created to manage SDFI. 
Presently, Statoil remains the most inf luential operator 
on the Norwegian continental shelf, holding 60% of the total 
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production. The company is listed on the Oslo and New York 
stock exchanges with 67 per cent of the shares still belonging 
to the Norwegian state. It is one of the most important petroleum 
companies in the world with projects in around 40 countries 
(Gordon, Stenvoll, 30–33).
Apart from a single state company operating fields, an important 
element of efforts to achieve the greatest possible value from the 
extraction of Norwegian petroleum resources is the efficient system 
for transporting oil and gas from the fields. In contrast to oil and 
gas fields operated by different companies, the gas transport 
infrastructure is under state monopoly. The authorities have a duty 
to ensure that in general the gas transport system is cost-effective 
and integrated, transport capacity is available for all interested 
players, and tariffs for access are low enough to avoid unnecessary 
costs for producers.
The transportation system of the gas from the Norwegian 
Continental Shelf to other European countries is operated by 
Gassco. This enterprise is wholly owned by the Norwegian State. It 
was established in 2001 as a result of an extensive reorganization 
of the Norwegian oil and gas sector (till 2001, the transport of gas 
was provided by a number of companies). Gassco is a neutral and 
independent operator ensuring that all users of the gas transport 
system have equal opportunities, both as regards utilization of the 
system and consideration of capacity increases. 
Gassco’s responsibilities include all activities connected with the 
transport of gas from the fields to the receiving terminals (also as an 
operator for terminals in Dunkerque –France, Zeebrugge – Belgium, 
Emden and Dornum – Germany), including planning, monitoring, 
co-ordinating and administering. It plays two various general roles 
called ‘special operatorship’ and ‘normal operatorship’. The former 
includes the responsibilities Gassco is directly assigned under the 
Petroleum Act and other regulations. These include developing new 
infrastructure, administering system capacity and coordinating and 
managing gas streams through the pipeline network to markets. 
The latter means running the infrastructure in accordance with the 
normative requirements mainly included in the Petroleum Act and 
other health& safety and environment legislation. 
The role of system operator and the actor with the best overview 
of the system, makes Gassco responsible for further developing 
an integrated Norwegian gas infrastructure. It gives advice 
to the government when new, major development projects are being 
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evaluated and also when interactions between new and existing 
infrastructure are assessed. 
The gas transportation system, that is to say pipelines and 
terminals, is mainly owned by the Gassled partnership which came 
into force on January 1, 2003. This joint venture integrated all of 
Norway’s gas transport systems and serves as the formal owner of 
the Norwegian gas transport infrastructure. Gassled’s owners as 
of December 9, 2015 are Petoro SA 46%, Solveig Gas Norway AS 
25%, Njord Gas Infrastucture AS 8%, and other companies (see 
Gassco). Gassled encompasses all gas facilities that are currently 
in use or are planned to be used to any significant degree by third 
parties. In addition, new pipelines and transport-related facilities 
are to be included in the venture from the time they are put to use 
by third parties, and are thus part of the central upstream gas 
transportation system. Surprisingly, it has no regular employees 
and is organized through various committees with specific 
assignments.
All commercial aspects of the State’s Direct Financial Interest 
assets have, since 2001, been managed by Petoro AS on behalf of 
the state and at the state’s expense and risk. This state-owned 
enterprise’s objective is to create the highest possible financial 
value from the state’s petroleum portfolio on the basis of sound 
business principles (it is not an operator). The company’s ability 
to generate income is closely related to its ability to collaborate with 
and influence operators and other partners, as Petoro has the same 
rights and obligations as the other licensees on the NCS. It’s role 
of identifying opportunities for boosting value creation also makes 
Petoro active in relation to the supplies industry, technology groups, 
the government and society as a whole.
The effectiveness of the Norwegian model
Undoubtedly, the real potential of the hydrocarbon management 
model of Norway can be best analyzed through the perspective 
of its economic and social consequences. In the course of last 
few decades, Norway’s hydrocarbon production has been highly 
important for the creation of the Norwegian welfare state and has 
been the main driving force behind the economic success of this 
relatively small Nordic state.
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First, the Norwegian petroleum industry has managed 
to create ripple effects both locally and regionally, from the 
southern provinces of Rogaland County, with Stavanger as 
a Statoil hometown, to the most northern areas of the Barents 
Sea. The industry is an employee for a substantial segment of the 
Norwegian population as oil companies and supply companies 
create about 150 000 jobs. However, taking into account the effect 
of the petroleum industry’s demand on the overall economy, the 
actual number of people connected with the sector may increase by 
100 000. All activities on the Norwegian continental shelf are also 
subject to strict requirements as regards to health & safety and 
the external environment, making Norwegian oil and gas as clean 
and safe as possible. Undoubtedly, the industry has been the most 
important factor in contributing to the sustainable development of 
the whole country. 
Professional, prospective, predictable and sustainable 
management of petroleum industry has transformed Norway into 
an important, international energy player. In 2015, ccording to the 
International Energy Agency (13), Norway was the third largest 
global net gas exporter with 107 bcm (after Russia – 179 bcm, and 
Qatar – 119 bcm) and covers more than 20% of the EU’s demand 
gas, competing with the Russian Federation for the top position. It 
was also the 15th largest oil producer in 2014 with 1904 thousands 
of barrels per day (US Energy Information Agency). 
The petroleum industry in Norway’s ranks at the very top in 
terms of value creation, state revenues and export value. In 2015, 
the sector witnessed relatively weaker results, which were mainly 
caused by the low prices of oil and gas on international markets. In 
2015, total revenue from the sector amounted to about 20 per cent 
of the state’s total revenues, which was 9% less than in 2013. The 
sector’s share of GDP also dropped from 21.5% in 2013 to 15% in 
2015, and its share of total exports shrunk by 10% from 48.9% (The 
Norwegian Petroleum Directorate e). 
Despite some periodic drops, petroleum revenues has been 
the main impetus for the Norwegian economy and wealth. 
All income produced by the sector is deposited in the Government 
Pension Fund – Global founded in 1990 (till January 2006 
– the Petroleum Fund of Norway, commonly referred to as the 
Oil Fund (Norwegian: Oljefondet). The Petroleum Fund was 
established to avoid the overheating of the economy, and the 
possibility of Dutch Disease, to counter the effects of the 
forthcoming decline in income and to smooth out the effects of oil 
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prices fluctuations (Holden). The fund’s direct income is generated 
mainly from taxes of companies, payments for license to explore, 
the State’s Direct Financial Interest and dividends from the partly 
state-owned Statoil. The fund invests its assets internationally in 
stocks, bonds and properties. As of 29 March 2016, its value was 
NOK 7138 bln (Norges Bank) meaning that the Norwegian state 
can be a net creditor for many developing countries, and the largest 
stock owner in Europe3.
Table 4. Macroeconomic Indicators for the Petroleum Sector, 1971–2017
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The immense wealth accumulated in the fund gives grounds 
to many political debates over such issues as the risk of investments 
in international stock portfolio, increase of direct spending of 
revenues within annual budgets, and an ethical framework for 
investments. First and second issues appear periodically dependent 
on the political climate, but there seem to be a consensus that first, 
financial risk is a natural outcome of a liberal economy and real 
gains can be achieved by participating in the market, and second 
3 The Fund’s total market value is permanently updated and visible on the 
webpage of the Norwegian Bank. 
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spending more money (supported by the Progress Party) can be 
dangerous for economic reasons.
In the case of third issue, all axiological problems connected 
with the fund’s assets are regulated by the Council on Ethics 
which is responsible for giving guidelines for fair, socially and 
environmentally friendly investments. According to the council’s 
regulations, the pension fund “shall not invest in companies which 
themselves or through entities they control: produce weapons 
that violate fundamental humanitarian principles through their 
normal use; produce tobacco; sell weapons or military material 
to states that are subject to investment restrictions on government 
bonds (Council on Ethics). Generally, all companies may be put 
under observation or be excluded if they contribute to or are 
responsible for: serious or systematic human rights violations, 
such as murder, torture, deprivation of liberty, forced labour and 
the worst forms of child labour; serious violations of the rights of 
individuals in situations of war or conflict; severe environmental 
damage; acts or omissions that on an aggregate company level 
lead to unacceptable greenhouse gas emissions; gross corruption 
other particularly serious violations of fundamental ethical norms 
(Council on Ethics). 
Most recently, on May 25, 2015 as a proof of their serious 
attitude towards the mitigation of green gasses emissions, 
a historical decision was taken by all Norwegian parliamentary 
parties to divest the pensions fund’s assets from mining companies 
and coal power producers. This can affect more than 120 companies 
across the world and would be the largest ever fossil fuel divestment 
with immense international effects (Carrington). It proves that 
indirectly Norwegian management of its oil and gas sector, which is 
based on commercial but also on axiological directives, has a more 
far-reaching global impact than one which is exclusively connected 
to the sales of hydrocarbons. 
Conclusions
The success of the Norwegian Model of hydrocarbons 
management is based on several factors such as the central role of 
the state, good interaction between the state authorities, national 
companies, supplier industry, special interest organizations and 
the research and development institutions creating networks and 
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clusters in many parts of the country. It is based on the strict 
separation of policy, commercial, and regulatory functions with 
state institutions responsible for different areas. Simultaneously 
the basic logic behind this is that private elements are essential 
to competitiveness so that the state cannot be an omnipotent 
actor. What is most important is that the sector is not vulnerable 
to current political pressures, as there is a wide political consensus 
that wealth should be sustained for future generations. The result 
is that the Norwegian petroleum sector can be called professional, 
predictable, prospective, and profitable. 
The final question is whether the Norwegian Model is applicable 
in other oil-exporting countries, can this type of administrative 
design be successful in other political settings. All over new 
petroleum frontiers this model is being examined by governments in 
Africa and Latin America with the aim of achieving good governance 
combined with heavy exploration and nascent production (Al-
Kashim). According to research of Mark Thurber et. al. this 
model, based on separation of different functions, can be applied 
only with regard to political and institutional context (12). Most 
of countries with oil and gas sector like Brazil, Mexico, Nigeria, 
Algeria, Malaysia, Saudi Arabia, Angola, Russia or Venezuela 
do not have strong institutional capacity and competitive political 
systems to copy all aspects or Norwegian system. In such cases it 
is more effective to create one all-purpose administrative tool than 
the system of multiple bodies checking and balancing euch other. 
What Norwegian Model also cherish is a long time perspective and 
wealth of the whole nation, both of which are unfamiliar for these 
countries. As a conclusion one may say that the Norwegian Model 
of hydrocarbon management, although very efficient, is not a kind 
of universal design. It has grown and matured in special political, 
social and economic setting which is quite unique and distant from 
political culture of many countries. 
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